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ABSTRACT

IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZATION IN AZERBAIJAN: THE
PROBLEM OF COMPETENCIES AND RESOURCES IN LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT

By
Elvin Yusifli
August 2013

Thesis supervised by Lew Irwin, Ph D.
This study explores the role of two institutional impediments, namely a lack of
power and resources, which slow the development of Azerbaijan’s local self-government.
In spite of the fact that the last two Azerbaijani governments have accepted the rationale
for and have taken steps towards democratic decentralization, local self-government has
remained a weak component of the country’s political and administrative system. The
study argues that limited municipal powers, combined with a scant and unsustainable
revenue stream, are one of, if not the most important, barrier to the institutionalization of
Azerbaijan’s local self-government. The study employs a descriptive mixed methods case
research method to analyze the current state of municipal powers and finances. The end
of the paper briefly discusses the changing structure of incentives, which may compel the
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government to reexamine its previously passive approach towards the problems and
suggests a number of areas from which improvements should begin.
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Introduction
Weak local self-government, which is exercised by the municipalities, is a major public
policy problem in Azerbaijan. The political decentralization process the country
undertook in the late 1990s has failed to produce a functioning system of local
governance. While in the past two decades, most countries in Central and Eastern Europe
have significantly reformed their political systems by establishing effective local
authorities, Azerbaijan’s municipalities have remained an institutionally weak component
of the country’s administrative system.
Compared to other policy issues, however, far too little attention has been paid to
institutional impediments to democratic decentralization in the country. The objective of
this research is to examine the role of two institutional problems, the lack of powers and
resources, in the country’s persistently weak local self-government.
This study has been divided into four sections. Section 1 provides the conceptual and
methodological framework of the study. The conceptual framework draws on the
decentralization literature to define the key notions used in this study and explain the
importance of local government powers and revenues for an effective decentralization
policy in Azerbaijan. The methodological framework lays out the data collection and
analysis techniques used in this study.
Section 2 illustrates the problems in the formal framework of local self-government and
the assignment of functions and competencies between municipalities and the local
executive authorities (LEAs). The section, first, identifies the problems in the
constitutional and legislative basis of municipal system. It, then, discusses municipal
functions within the context of intergovernmental relations and explores the problems in
x

the areas of economic and social development responsibilities currently assigned to
municipalities. In the end, the main points of the section are summed up.
Section 3 deals with the revenue dimension of the problems in local self-government. It
analyzes the financial indicators of a sample of 16 municipalities, the Municipal
Performance Management System, collected by the Eurasian Partnership Foundation,
within its “Transparency in Municipal Service Delivery Program.”1 This part provides a
brief overview of the formal framework of municipal finances. Then, it analyzes the main
trends of municipal finances, including the general problems relating to municipal
revenues, local infrastructure and the revenue sources. The findings are summarized at
the end of the section.
Section 4 discusses the reasons for the absence of an effective local self-government
reform and explains how the changing political and economic situation in Azerbaijan
may compel the government to reconsider its policy towards municipalities. It finally
discusses a number of changes the government should undertake to address the problems
of powers and resources in local self-government.

xi

1. Research Design
Conceptual Framework
Defining Decentralization
Decentralization is a broad and ambiguous concept, which entails a number of
definitions. Manor identifies six meanings of this term, which range from
“decentralization by default,” privatization and delegation to administrative, fiscal, and
political decentralization.2 This study is focused on the last three forms of
decentralization – administrative, fiscal and political decentralization, all of which take
place within political systems and concern the idea of local government. Many
governments are engaged, at least, in one of these three forms of decentralization.
Administrative decentralization, also known as deconcentration, entails a delegation of
authority and responsibility for, at least, one policy area to semiautonomous agents of the
state.3 Deconcentration allows the central government to increase the efficiency of local
services while preserving its political authority over localities. Fiscal decentralization
refers to the shift of authority over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels. 4 The
main argument for fiscal decentralization is that it can improve allocative efficiency of
public services.5 Finally, devolution, which underlies most political decentralization,6
refers to the transfer of decision-making, finances, and management to quasi-autonomous
units of local government7. Devolution boils down to three key concepts – autonomy
(legitimacy), authority, and resources of local self-government.8
Azerbaijan has carried out both deconcentration and devolution of government. The local
executive authorities (the LEAs), which implement the policies of the central government
1

in the localities, are deconcentrated units of governments. Locally elected and quasiautonomous municipalities, on the other hand, are devolved bodies of government.

Rationale for Democratic Decentralization
Decentralization reforms gained popularity in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the
changing political and economic realities in the world. Governments were driven by
different motives to decentralize, but the fundamental reason behind these reform
initiatives was to improve governance.9 The top-down model of government, which had
performed reasonably well in the pre and post-World War Two periods, gradually
became less responsive and productive vis-à-vis the changing social and economic
problems of the time. The trend of democratization and economic liberalization in the
past three decades facilitated the widespread application of varying degrees of power
redistribution in developed and developing countries alike. After the disintegration of the
USSR, the newly independent states, including Azerbaijan, undertook democratic
decentralization as part of broader democratic and institutional reforms aimed at statebuilding.
The argument for devolving government rests on a rich body of decentralization
literature. Advocates of decentralization contend that it enhances the quality of
government in multiple ways. Democratic decentralization increases the allocative
efficiency of local services. Olson’s theory of fiscal equivalency posits that for a service
to be optimally delivered, the production and consumption areas should overlap. This
reduces the free-rider problem in the delivery of public services.10 Oates’ decentralization
theorem also points to increased efficiency gains from localized delivery of public
services.11 This is because policies of regional and local governments can better reflect
2

local preferences and circumstances than a central policy, which usually entails a onesize-fits-all approach.
Decentralization also increases the quality of public services by loosening the central
government monopoly on power and by creating a competitive environment among units
of sub-national government.12 Inter-jurisdictional competition not only induces local
authorities to perform more effectively, but also allows individuals to choose among
jurisdictions that offers services better suited to their tastes.13
Democratic decentralization leads to more accountability and responsiveness of
politicians by bringing government closer to the people.14 Local politicians, due to their
proximity to their constituency, are better aware of the citizens’ expectations and needs,
and also face more pressure from them, compared to national politicians, to govern in line
with their wishes. Local elections provide an important mechanism, through which the
citizens can reward or punish their elected officials based on the quality of their
performance.
Some authors argue that the transfer of powers to local elected authorities may decrease
the overall level of corruption, too. According to Manor, even though the number of
corrupt practices may increase as a result of decentralization, the total amount of funds
stolen reduces, in part because the reform “provides many more with a little power to
peddle.”15 Additionally, increased transparency at the local level curtails the divergence
of local funds. Shah argues that decentralized government system reduces corruption in
the long run by strengthening accountability and responsiveness of sub-national
government.16

3

Decentralized management of public affairs thus holds promise for a country like
Azerbaijan, where there exist many problems characteristic of centralized political
systems. Azerbaijan’s top-down administered and large public sector is highly inefficient
in service delivery. In 2008, over 36 percent of Azerbaijan’s labor force was employed in
the public sector, as opposed to 19 percent in Armenia and 21 percent in Georgia
(2006).17 Nonetheless, the standards of public administration in Azerbaijan leave a lot to
be desired.
In spite of a steadily growing state budget since 2005, there remain serious structural
problems in the management of the state expenditures.18 Lack of transparency in how the
state funds are spent creates a fertile ground for corrupt practices in the state institutions.
Azerbaijan ranks 139 out of 174 countries in the Corruption Perception Index of
Transparency International.19 In the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2011-2012 of
the World Economic Forum, Azerbaijan is listed 95th in terms of diversion of public
funds, and 118th in terms of the absence of irregular payments and bribes among 142
countries.20
The situation is not better when it comes to the quality of social services. Azerbaijan’s
public education system compares poorly with other European countries. In the same
GCR’s report, the country ranks 113 among 142 states for the quality of its education
system.21 In the healthcare sector, many problems persist as well. For instance, life
expectancy at birth in Azerbaijan is not only well below the European average, but also
lower than its neighbors, Armenia and Georgia, both of which have a smaller GDP per
capita.22
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Thus, the theory holds that effective sub-national government can significantly contribute
towards addressing some of these problems. However, as the problems in Azerbaijan’s
local self-government indicate, establishing a functioning local government is easier said
than done. The theoretical postulates discussed above proved effective in some countries
(both developed and developing), but in others (mostly developing) they failed to yield
desired results. The prevailing explanation of these varying degrees of success has been
that decentralization works in those countries, where minimum institutional prerequisites
for decentralization are satisfied. Whereas Azerbaijan’s decentralization reform has not
failed (because, it is still incompletely implemented), it nonetheless produced weak local
self-government institution, which is not capable of facilitating local development. This
study argues that inadequate powers and resources of Azerbaijan’s municipalities is one
of, if not the most important determinant of Azerbaijan’s unfruitful devolution.

Power and Resource Dimensions of Devolution
Inadequate powers, in this study, denote unclear assignment of formal local government
functions and competencies, and lack of discretion in carrying out them. Functions are
“what governments do or the fields of activities in which they play a de facto role,” while
competencies refer to “responsibilities and powers, formally bestowed by law, with
which public authorities are entrusted in each field of activity.”23
Clarity of responsibility assignment among different levels of government is important to
ensure accountability, and to prevent inefficient overlap of authority and legal
challenges.24 When the law is unclear on the competencies of local government vis-à-vis
other government entities, “instability and controversy in the practice of decentralized
systems” arises.25 In developing countries, the obscure and incomplete division of work
5

among different units of government often creates obstacles to local authorities’ exercise
of their own share of responsibilities. This problem usually derives from the absence of a
clear vision of what decentralization would serve to achieve. An analysis of the
decentralization process in 5 transition economies of the Balkans and South Caucasus
found that a lack of a comprehensive strategy, and the one-off approach to power
distribution, was one of the major challenges to the emergence of competent local
authorities in these countries prior to 2005.
Sub-national government should also have enough discretion in performing its formal
responsibilities and powers. Page and Goldsmith distinguish between formal
responsibilities assigned to local government and their discretion in making a decision in
local matters. As they put it, “For local government to “have” or “fulfill” a service, or
part of it, means little more than that local authorities have formal responsibility for
employing people to carry it out. It does not necessarily mean that they can influence the
way in which it is carried out because they may have little discretion to do so.” 26
Therefore, it is equally important both to set up a clear framework of formal powers and
functions and guarantee sufficient local government discretion to make a decision.
Assignment of adequate funds to local government is an equally important determinant of
its effective performance. For it to be able to reasonably finance local services and
infrastructure needs, local government has to be granted required powers to raise enough
revenues.27 In practice, local governments of many countries, including Azerbaijan
confront the revenue problem to varying degrees, so providing them with adequate
funding is often difficult. However, a number of principles drawn from the theory and
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practice of fiscal decentralization are helpful in predicting the success or failure of this
process.
There is wide consensus in the decentralization literature that “finance should follow
function,”28 or in other words, revenue sources should be determined after the local
government functions and competencies are clearly delineated. According to Bahl, the
assignment of expenditure responsibility should precede the assignment of revenue
responsibility for two reasons, first, to ensure efficient allocation of resources, and
second, to better assign the revenue sources.29 The transfer of revenue authority to a
lower level without first considering their expenditure needs can lead to tensions in
intergovernmental relations and fiscal instability.30
There is also credible evidence indicating that financial decentralization is more
successful when local government prioritizes its own taxes to cover its expenditure needs.
The more the local government relies on the taxes of its residents, the more it can be held
accountable by them.31 A larger share of own-taxes in the local budget not only ensures
increased downward accountability of local politicians, but also raises the efficiency of
local services. Kaelin assigns the better local services in the Scandinavian countries,
Great Britain and Switzerland compared to Italy, Spain and France to the relative
independence of the former from the center in carrying out their responsibilities and
raising their own revenues.32
However, in many countries own-tax sources are rarely adequate to meet the service and
infrastructure requirements of the communities. This is especially true in developing
countries, where the local tax base is weak or the dependence on central government
subsidies is strong.33 This problem is usually compounded by many central governments’
7

shift of expenditure responsibilities to local authorities without concomitant revenues.34
Local tax administration is also hampered by generally lower administrative capacity of
local authorities compared to central authorities.35
Given that local taxes are not always proportionate to local needs, how can local
authorities effectively finance their services? Two widely used options to bridge the
vertical fiscal imbalance (the gap between own spending and own revenues of subnational government36) are intergovernmental grants (or transfers) and sub-national
borrowing. Intergovernmental grants can be used to finance specific local services
(earmarked grants) or to complement sub-national budgets (non-earmarked grants). Subnational government often needs to borrow to finance its long-term investment projects,
because a yearly budget is usually inadequate to meet the capital needs of communities.
An important caveat to provision of grants and access to credit is that the central
government should have a regulatory framework (e.g. hard budget constraint) and
accountability mechanisms (e.g. local elections, financial transparency) in place to reduce
the moral hazard.
Having considered the institutional significance of clear and adequate powers, and
enough revenue (sources) to successful decentralization, this study asks whether these
requirements have been satisfied for Azerbaijan’s municipalities. Are municipal functions
and competencies clearly assigned and municipalities given enough discretion over
formal powers? Have municipalities been granted necessary revenue-raising authority?
Are there effective transfer and borrowing opportunities available to them? By addressing
these questions, the study aims to contribute both to a currently limited body of research
on municipal powers and funding in Azerbaijan and the public discourse on how to
8

improve the country’s weak local self-government in order to strengthen its role in the
local development.

Research Questions
A limited body of literature indicates that there are serious problems, both in terms of
municipal powers and in finances in Azerbaijan. Taking into account the institutional
importance of both factors, this study aims to answer the following research questions:
1. Do Azerbaijan’s municipalities possess sufficient authority over local matters?
2. Do the country’s municipalities have sufficient financial resources to carry out
their responsibilities?

Research Methods
A descriptive mixed methods case study approach was chosen to describe the problems
pertaining to the municipal powers and resources in Azerbaijan. A mixed methods study
employs a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques in a single or a series of
studies.37 The rationale for the use of both approaches is that together they provide a
better understanding of a research problem.38 This study draws on both sources of data to
illuminate the problem of weak local self-government in Azerbaijan.
The decision to select the case study method is driven by its advantage in investigating a
complex problem in its natural setting or context. Yin defines case research “as an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident;
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”39 Bhattacherjee also mentions
among the unique strengths of case research the fact that it “can help derive richer, more
contextualized, and more authentic interpretation of the phenomenon of interest than
9

most other research methods by virtue of its ability to capture a rich array of contextual
data.”40 Case research is relevant to the topic of this study in two ways. First, political
decentralization is a multi-faceted and intricate reform program that concerns such
diverse aspects of governance as legislation, finances, administration and politics. The
complexity of the research subject requires a contextualized analysis of competencies and
resources of local self-government. Second, Azerbaijan’s municipalities are an
understudied subject and rife with “gray areas.” Given a paucity of credible research on
this issue, it is often challenging to determine where the problem of competencies ends
and the problem of resources start. The case research method allows the examining of
challenges in the area of municipal powers and resources in their broader context and
provides a holistic view of these problems.
As the research questions indicate, the study is descriptive and uses a “what is?”
approach. Also known as “correlational” and “observational” research, this research
approach is concerned with the collection and analysis of information without
manipulation of the environment. This descriptive research aims to portray the present
conditions of municipal authority and their resources to exercise this authority and where
possible suggest the explanations of the existing problems.

Data Collection and Analysis
The research has employed both qualitative and quantitative research methods to collect
and analyze data. The qualitative approach is used to investigate the problem of authority,
while quantitative method is applied to the research of the revenue problem in
Azerbaijan’s municipalities.

10

Desk Research
In order to determine whether Azerbaijan’s local governments possess sufficient
functions and competencies, the study has focused on the legislative framework of the
local government. Desk research, also known as the secondary data collection method,
has been used to obtain information for this purpose. The study largely relies on the use
of primary sources, such as laws, and secondary sources like reports, research articles,
and mass media. The legislation studied in this work primarily concerns the institution of
local government in Azerbaijan, and includes the Constitution of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, the Law on Status of Municipalities, the Regulations on Local Executive
Authorities, as well as other pieces of legislation that deal with particular aspects of local
self-government, for example, the Law on Water Management of Municipalities. In order
to provide the context for the discussion, academic and media reports are widely cited.
The analysis of the data has been conducted on the basis of the following criteria (or subquestions):
-

Does the current local self-government legislation provide an effective framework
for the operation of municipalities?

-

Are municipal functions and competencies clearly delineated?

-

Do municipalities have sufficient discretion over the functions and competencies
assigned to them?

The analysis is done within two general thematic categories:
-

The constitutional and legislative status of Azerbaijan’s municipalities, and,

-

The assignment of responsibilities between them and the local executive
authorities.
11

Quantitative Research
A quantitative approach is employed to explore the problems of municipal finances and
administrative resources. This part of the research primarily draws on a sample of raw
data from Azerbaijan’s 16 municipalities. The Municipal Performance Management
System, a set of municipal indicators, have been generated by the Eurasian Partnership
Foundation within the framework of its “Transparency in Municipal Service Delivery
Program” to help municipalities measure their performance and develop their strategic
plans. The dataset includes basic statistics about municipalities, including their budgets,
administrative resources, their present social and environmental programs, local
infrastructure, etc. The municipalities from which the data has been collected include 7
city municipalities (Gabala, Gusar, Khachmaz, Lankaran, Mingachevir, Salyan, and
Siyazan), 8 village municipalities (Aran, Boluslu, Dallar Cayir, Dallar Dashbulag,
Garabork, Garakhanli, and Khatinli) and a settlement municipality (Orta Laki). 41 The
combined population of 7 city municipalities accounts for approximately 10 percent of
the total urban population of Azerbaijan, excluding Baku, the capital city. However, due
to the fact that village municipalities account for about 90 percent of Azerbaijan’s
municipalities, the sample size of 8 municipalities constitutes a smaller proportion of
village municipalities.
Due to the near-absence of data on municipal finances, there is little research in the
financial situation of individual municipalities. The central government does not share the
basic statistics on municipalities in Azerbaijan. Also, most municipalities fail to publish
the essential information on their activities, such as municipal budgets, programs, etc.
Approximately, 1 percent of Azerbaijan’s 1716 municipalities have websites.42 Even so,
12

not all of the municipalities, which have a website, are transparent with respect to their
finances. For these reasons, prior studies have mainly focused on the general indicators of
municipal finances, such as the total revenues or expenditures of Azerbaijan’s
municipalities, or the size of intergovernmental transfers to local self-government, on
which the information is made available by the State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan.
The study uses simple quantitative analysis to evaluate the numeric data from 16
municipalities of Azerbaijan. The analysis is primarily based on the use of averages,
median, mean and mode, percentages and graphical representations of the data.
To determine if currently municipalities have sufficient revenues to exercise selfgovernment effectively, the study investigates,
-

the projected and actual budgets of 16 municipalities,

-

the state of local infrastructure,

-

the sustainability of municipal revenue sources,

-

And the government aid to municipalities.

13

2. Powers of Local Self-Government: Clear,
Comprehensive and Sufficient?
Introduction
This section explores the legislative basis of municipal authority and the framework of
intergovernmental relations to determine whether municipalities have been granted clear
and adequate functions and competencies, and enough discretion to carry them out. It
begins with an examination of the formal status of Azerbaijan’s municipalities and
identifies the definitional problems pertaining to the status of local government. Then, it
analyzes the shortcomings of the present form of responsibility assignment between
municipalities and the LEAs, the devolved and deconcentrated units of local government
in Azerbaijan. Following a brief examination of obstacles to municipal role in economic
development, the section looks more closely at the problems in the assignment of two
social development responsibilities, the maintenance of apartment houses and the
provision of drinking water. This part ends with a summary of conclusions on the
problems of municipal authority.

Constitutional and Legislative Framework for Local Self-Government
Constitution and Municipalities
Azerbaijan’s commitment to democratic decentralization is enshrined in two main
documents, the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which the country adopted in
1995, and the European Charter of Local Self-Government (hereafter, the Charter), which
it ratified in 2002. The Constitution provides a basic framework for local self-government
in the territory of Azerbaijan. Article 142 of the Constitution stipulates that local selfgovernment is exercised by municipalities, which are elected every 4 years. Articles 14214

146 lay down the key principles of local self-government, including municipal functions
and competencies. However, the document neither expressly mentions the people’s right
to local self-government, nor does it grant municipalities a full and exclusive local
authority. The Charter makes it incumbent on the signatories to make formal guarantees
about autonomy and exclusivity of powers held by local elected authorities. While the
former requirement was later included in the Law on Status of Municipalities, the latter
prerequisite of effective local government organization is not incorporated into other
local self-government-related legislation.
The constitutional definition of a sub-national government is ambiguous and paradoxical.
Although it establishes local self-government, it also creates local units of the executive
branch, the LEAs, without clearly articulating the limits of their involvement in local
affairs. Municipalities and the LEAs operate in parallel, and as the ensuing discussion
will show, often are tasked with similar local responsibilities. Pursuant to Article 124 of
the Constitution, the head of the LEA is appointed by the President and is responsible for
implementing the central government’s policies locally. The same article grants authority
to the President to determine the limits of their competencies. This provision effectively
subjects the meaning and substance of local self-government to presidential discretion.
The LEAs were modeled on the executive committees of the local councils of people’s
deputies, a local government system in the USSR. Although the local councils, better
known as the soviets, formally exercised local self-governance, the real administrative
power belonged to their “elected” executive committees. The main function of these
committees, within a firmly consolidated political system of the USSR, was to execute
15

decisions of the central government in localities. The constitution of 1995 annulled the
older system, but it handed over the bulk of its powers and responsibilities to the LEAs.
As a result, instead of ensuring the exclusive authority of democratically elected
municipalities in local affairs, it established an institutional parallelism at the lower level
of government.

European Charter of Local Self-Government
Azerbaijan’s government signed the Charter as part of reform commitments it undertook
by becoming a Council of Europe (CoE) member in 2011. It is a binding international
convention that commits the parties to ensuring minimum standards required for political,
administrative, and financial independence of local government. 43 The fundamental idea
lying at the heart of the charter is the principle of subsidiarity. This approach states that
public responsibilities should be carried out by those authorities that are closest to the
citizen. The allocation of a local responsibility to a higher level of government is only
then permissible if the latter can do it more efficiently and economically.44
The Charter defines local self-government, as “the right and ability of [elected] local
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of
public affairs, under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local
population.”45 To empower sub-national government to “manage a substantial share of
public affairs,” they should be provided with a number of guarantees. Article 4 states that
local authorities should have full discretion in matters that are within their discretion or
not assigned to other bodies. Powers granted them should be full and exclusive. Article 9
stipulates that revenues sources of sub-national government should be “sufficiently
16

diversified and buoyant” to meet their growing expenditure needs adequately. The central
governments also undertake the commitment to support weaker local authorities (e.g.
most rural municipalities of Azerbaijan) through financial equalization schemes,
including grants. The Charter requires that local authorities be able to borrow from
national markets for capital investments.
A series of monitoring reports of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
published after Azerbaijan’s signing of the Charter have pointed out numerous problems
in Azerbaijan’s implementation of the responsibilities arising from the aforementioned
provisions of the document.46 The findings of this section also corroborate the
conclusions of these reports that the main provisions of the convention remain unapplied
in Azerbaijan.

Law on Status of Municipalities
The Law on Status of Municipalities (1999) provides the main legislative framework for
Azerbaijan’s local self-government. Under the law, Azerbaijan has a single-tier local selfgovernment, which is composed of municipalities at different administrative-territorial
units (city, city district, settlement and village). Each unit of sub-national government is
responsible for providing local services in the territory under its jurisdiction. There is no
subordination between municipalities of varying sizes. Currently, there are 1718
municipalities, the majority of which are village municipalities. 18.3 percent of them
have a population below 1000 people, 63.8 percent between 1000-5000, and 17.9 percent
over 5000.47 In terms of territorial and population sizes, Azerbaijan’s municipalities are
more fragmented compared to those of other European countries. Municipalities are
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headed by directly elected municipal councils. The head and deputy-heads of a municipal
council are elected by a simple majority vote of the council members. The law grants
authority to municipal authorities to adopt programs in 4 policy areas: social protection,
social development, economic development and environment.48
Shortcomings of the Law

The Law on Status of Municipalities falls short of establishing an adequate framework
for effective performance of municipalities. This study identifies three general
deficiencies in the design of the law.
First, the law grants municipalities a limited number of competencies. The primary
responsibility for most local services remains vested in the LEAs and line ministries. The
law states that municipalities can address only those problems in each category of
assignments (e.g. social development), on which the state programs do not take action, or
complement what the state already does. This stipulation deters municipalities from
introducing policies in many of those areas, because the central government already
carries out a wide range of programs in those categories through the LEAs and sectoral
ministries. For example, it is practically impossible for municipalities to participate in the
maintenance or management of public schools, because the Ministry of Education is
responsible for both tasks.
Second, the law fails to clearly delineate the boundaries of municipal functions and
competencies. Currently, those responsibilities are so enmeshed that municipalities are
not able to perform a task without crossing into the domain of other institutions
(especially, the LEAs). For instance, the law lists maintenance of municipal territories,
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including waste removal as municipal responsibilities, but other laws state that the LEAs
or their contractors can do these tasks.49 As noted earlier, the existing body of
decentralization literature highlights the importance of clearly articulated boundaries of
local government powers and responsibilities to its effective operation. Since there are
multiple interacting authority structures in Azerbaijan’s localities, the requirement for a
precise division of local competencies is even more important there.
Lastly, the law does not specify the mechanisms, through which municipalities can
exercise their tasks. Neither does other legislation clarify the guidelines as to how
municipalities can perform their duties. The absence of formal mechanisms creates a
policy vacuum that affects the efficacy of municipal service delivery. One of the areas
this problem manifests itself is the provision of drinking water in Azerbaijan’s villages.
The law tasks municipalities with supplying drinking water to their residents, but it does
not clarify how municipalities can handle this responsibility, if their water-related
projects can only take place within the boundaries of municipal lands (not territories),
which are often far from residential areas.
These problems can be fully appreciated if considered in the context of municipal
relations with the central government bodies, the LEAs and line ministries.

Municipalities and Local Executive Authorities
The LEAs, deconcentrated units of the central government control many of the local
service and development assignments in Azerbaijan. They were established earlier than
municipalities (patterned after the previous system of executive committees) and were the
only sub-national authority until the institution of local self-government in 2000.
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Democratic decentralization in Azerbaijan has been, to a large extent, shaped by their
presence and active involvement in local affairs. Until recently, the LEAs performed their
responsibilities within the framework of the Regulations on Local Executive Authorities
of 1999. In June 2012, the President approved the new Regulations, which granted them
additional powers, strengthening their dominant position in Azerbaijan’s local affairs.
According to the latest report of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, this
statute “provides local executive authorities with almost all the functions of local
government, including those that under other laws would fall within the scope of the
powers of municipalities.”50
The new Regulations constitute a significant departure from the government’s
commitment of democratic decentralization under the Constitution and the Charter. The
government of Azerbaijan claims that the purpose of the new law is to enhance the
functions of the LEAs, not to curtail the municipal powers.51 However, the document
assigns wide powers and responsibilities to the head of the LEA, which are very detailed
compared to those of municipalities, and inclusive of virtually all aspects of local
governance and development. The responsibilities of the head of the LEA covers diverse
areas such as socio-economic development, agricultural development, budgeting and
finances, development of consumer market and businesses, social protection and gender
equality, healthcare and ecological safety, labor relations and employment, housing and
renovation, construction, education and culture in localities.
Some of these competencies are beyond the capacity of individual municipalities to
handle; therefore the involvement of the upper tier authority is necessary. In most
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countries, this problem is addressed through the adoption of a multi-tier local government
model. In such a system, local functions and competencies are distributed among
different levels of elected authority. For instance, Poland has a three-tier local
government, composed of gminas (the first tier), powiats (the second tier) and
voivodeships (the third tier - regional). Each level of government has their own
responsibilities within individual areas of governance. In the area of pre-higher
education, gminas administer public kindergartens, primary schools and gymnasia.
Powiats run upper secondary schools, artistic and special schools, and voivodeships
coordinate function and supervises the implementation of the central government’s
educational policies.52 As stated earlier, in most European countries, including the
countries of Eastern Europe, which share a common past with Azerbaijan, the assignment
of powers is based on the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the Charter. The higher
tiers of a multi-level government are assigned those responsibilities, which they can
perform more efficiently and economically. Functions, which are not clearly assigned to
the upper authorities, are usually reserved to the lower.
In Azerbaijan, the distribution of responsibilities between the LEAs and municipalities is
not based on the principle of subsidiarity. The LEA, an unelected equivalent of the higher
tier authorities in Azerbaijan (e.g. powiats in Poland), also controls assignments at
municipal level. The chief executive of the rayon or district is responsible for almost all
socio-economic functions in the territory of that particular region, while his appointees
carry out local tasks in smaller administrative-territorial units, such as cities, towns and
villages. Since they are not directly elected by the citizens, they cannot be held
accountable by the public.
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On a number of broader policy issues, the Regulations stipulate that the LEAs should
take into account the views and suggestions of municipalities. For instance, under Article
3.2 of the Regulations, the LEAs are tasked with projecting and planning the socialeconomic development of districts (rayons), cities, and city districts, in collaboration with
municipalities and other local institutions. However, since the LEAs prepare proposals of
local development programs and receive the state funds to implement them, the role of
municipalities in the overall decision-making process is ceremonial.
Some of the formal competencies of the LEAs directly concern the issues, for which
municipalities are also responsible under Azerbaijan's laws. Others provide them with
far-reaching authority over tasks traditionally done by local self-government, but not
clearly assigned to Azerbaijan's municipalities. Since the boundaries of the LEA and
municipal authority in local affairs are ill-defined, the new law adversely impacts the
political-administrative status of local self-government. Thus, the current framework
leaves municipalities little discretion over a significant portion of the responsibilities
granted them by the Law on Status of Municipalities.

Functions of Economic Development
The Law on Status of Municipalities broadly defines four areas, agriculture, industry,
transportation and communications, in which municipalities can develop their economic
programs. But there neither exist necessary formal mechanisms for their exercise of these
prerogatives, nor does the current level of municipal resources suffice to enable them to
address local economic problems. The revenue problem will be discussed in more detail
in the next section.
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Despite the fact that the law envisions a role for municipalities in local development, the
economic aspect of local governance remains the domain of the LEAs. This is primarily
because the state (as noted above, municipalities are not formally part of the state) is the
key economic actor in the country’s regions outside of the capital city. The oil boom in
the second half of the last decade has boosted the public investment in the infrastructure
projects and social development in Azerbaijan’s relatively poor regions. The central
government has exclusively relied on the LEAs and the respective ministries in the
management of its fast growing investments in the regions.
The Regulations provide the head of the LEA with broad powers in the economic
development of the district, of which he is in charge. Article 4.2 vests the power to
execute the socio-economic development of districts (rayons), cities and city districts in
the LEAs. The same article also authorizes the LEAs to participate in the programs to
improve the industrial potential of the regions, to prepare regional development plans,
make relevant recommendations to municipalities, create favorable conditions for
investments by physical and legal entities, and manage the construction of social and
manufacturing infrastructure. Pursuant to Article 4.3, the LEAs manage the state’s
investment programs in the agriculture sector, carry out policies to support local farmers
and take part in the improvement of local agro-infrastructure in communities.
In contrast, the Law on Status of Municipalities only briefly states that municipalities can
develop their plans in the above areas. This situation has led to municipalities’ exclusion
from local development programs. For instance, municipalities received AZN 1 to 5
million ($1.27 to $6.34 million at current exchange rates) annually from the state since
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1999. For comparison, one estimate indicates that the amount of public and foreign
investments in local projects, such as irrigation, drinking water provision, local roads,
schools and hospitals, managed by the LEAs and sectoral ministries in 2012 was in the
region of half a billion AZN (approximately 7-8 percent of the total investment for that
year).53
The role of municipalities in local development was further undermined by a recent
change in the law, which has made the creation of municipal businesses illegal. The Law
on Local (Municipal) Taxes and Fees stipulates that property tax on municipally owned
legal entities is one revenue source of local self-government. The Law on Status of
Municipalities, too, affirms the right of municipalities to set up their own commercial
entities. But the Civil Code of Azerbaijan, which under the newly passed Law on
Normative Legislative Acts supersedes conflicting municipal legislation, outlaws
municipal participation in business partnerships and company associations.54 Media
reports indicate that the Ministry of Taxes has ceased registering municipal entities, after
the Law on Normative Legislative Acts came into effect in 2011.55

Functions of Social Development
When it comes to social responsibilities, some authors note that currently municipalities
only carry out four of the assignments included in the list: the maintenance of local roads,
the provision of social aid to those who are not on the list of the state’s programs of social
protection, the maintenance of cemeteries and the organization of funerals.56 This study
explores the direct impact of the legislative loopholes on the provision of two basic social
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services, namely communal services to multi-family residential housing in the cities and
drinking water supply in the villages.
Maintenance of Apartment Houses

One of the functions, over which municipalities lack decision-making authority, is the
provision of basic utility services to the residents of apartment buildings in their
territories. Apartment houses are mainly concentrated in the cities of Azerbaijan and
accommodate a considerable portion of the urban population, who are also the consumers
of communal services. The Law on Status of Municipalities stipulates that municipal
programs can also entail the maintenance and management of the residential and nonresidential buildings in their territories. The law also lists among environmental programs
of municipalities refuse collection and disposal. Currently, the service provision to the
majority of apartment houses is under the control of the Housing and Communal Services
Departments (HCSDs), the subunits of the LEAs, which are subsidized by the central
government. This has resulted in municipal disengagement from the delivery of services
to a large percentage of their residents in the urban areas and has also deprived them of
the service fees, which could partially alleviate the problem of funding they currently
face.
Until recently, under the Housing Code of 1986, the HCSDs were formally responsible
for delivering communal services to the state-owned apartment blocks. The recently
enacted Housing Code of the Azerbaijan Republic (2009) reformed the ownership of the
formerly state-owned apartment houses, and terminated the legal responsibility of the
HCSDs to provide communal services to private apartment buildings. However, the
institution of the HCSD still retains its monopoly over service delivery to apartment
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buildings, regardless of their type of ownership.57 In spite of the formal requirement,
usually they do not have a contract with the residents of a building they undertake to
manage.
Between 2004 and 2010, the state allocations to the HCSDs made up AZN 68.42
million.58 The amount of grants in 2012 alone was AZN 18 million. Of this, AZN 10.1
million were for their maintenance costs, doubling the entire government aid to
municipalities, and AZN 7.7 million for capital repairs in the state housing fund. 59 The
state subsidies are provided in addition to the revenues they receive in the form of the
charges for services, such as waste removal and housing. It is difficult to ascertain if the
current level of the revenue allows them to effectively furnish the communal services, but
the HCSDs are one of the least transparent state institutions in the country. They do not
report to the LEAs about how they spend their funds, nor do they make the information
available to the public.60 Not surprisingly, the media reports indicate popular
dissatisfaction with the institution itself and the quality of the services they provide. 61
There are cases, when municipalities step in to do some of their responsibilities, despite
the fact that they do not receive any compensation from the state. In a recent interview,
Tahir Rzayev, a member of the ruling party, and the committee on Regional Affairs of
the Milli Majlis, the parliament of Azerbaijan, has also confirmed this trend and stressed
the need for financially assisting municipalities to reduce the extra cost of municipal
programs supplementing ineffective HCSD services.62 The deputy has also noted these
organizations are not able to cope with their responsibilities anymore and it would be
appropriate to transfer those responsibilities to the municipalities.63 In her latest report to
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the parliament, Elmira Suleymanova, the Commissioner for Human Rights of Azerbaijan,
has noted an increase in the number of complaints about the HCSDs and emphasized the
deteriorating quality of their services. As a way-out of this problem, she also
recommended termination of this institution, and transfer of their responsibilities to
municipalities.64 However, these statements should be taken with a grain of salt, because
there is a strong institutional resistance to the empowerment of municipalities. For
instance, a bill to grant additional powers to municipalities has been on the shelf of the
parliament for almost 6 years now.65 The original purpose of the legislation was to
specify the rules and mechanisms of assigning specific responsibilities to local selfgovernment.
Some authors also point to the interference of the HCSDs in the financial domain of
municipalities. Property tax on private individuals is one of the revenue sources of
municipalities, but allegedly there are cases, when the HCSDs collect property tax, in
addition to housing fees, from the residents of the apartment complexes. Although there
is no systematic investigation into the incidence of this violation, anecdotal evidence
from some municipalities show that the HCSDs use their administrative powers (e.g.
issuance of a residency certification) to collect property tax from the residents of
apartment blocks.66
The transfer of HCSD responsibilities to municipalities should not be equated with their
direct involvement in the management and maintenance of the existing housing stock. It
is neither economical nor effective for actors other than the owners of buildings to take
care of their property. Some authors argue that the optimal solution to the problem is an
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arrangement, such as condominium, in which the residents of the housing complex make
their own decisions on the issues concerning their property and pay for the related costs.
However, it seems unfeasible, in the light of the existing life standards and the public
perception of the state’s social responsibilities that the government of Azerbaijan could or
would completely disengage from the operation of all apartment houses anytime soon.
The transparency of the government spending and the effectiveness of municipal
authority could be enhanced though, if the continued government involvement in
maintaining and managing of apartment houses is done through municipalities, the
elected authority, rather than the HCSDs, the appointed and notoriously inefficient units
of the state. Hypothetically, such an arrangement would also increase accountability and
citizen involvement in the local decision-making. The citizens would pay the fees or
taxes to the local budget and would be able to hold their elected representatives
accountable for the services provided.
Provision of Drinking Water

Providing drinking water to households is one of the areas, in which Azerbaijan’s rural
municipalities, the “weakest link” of the country’s local self-government confront major
problems. The Law on Status of Municipalities includes "the use of water resources of
local importance, the operation, maintenance and development of water supply and
sewerage system" in the list of social development competencies of municipalities.
However, the other legislation considerably limits the role of municipalities in these
areas.
The heart of the problem lies in the Law on Water Management of Municipalities, which
defines municipal water management as “policies pertaining to the regulation, use, and
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preservation of ground water and surface water of local importance and prevention of
water damage in municipal lands.”67 Municipal lands constitute only a fraction of
municipal territories, which often overlap with administrative-territorial units, such as
cities or villages. By confining municipal involvement to municipal property, the law
prevents them from effectively meeting the drinking water needs of rural population.
Oftentimes, municipal lands are outside of the housing areas of the villages and water
systems in these lands are primarily designed for agricultural purposes.68 Therefore, those
sources are not always conducive to efficient water delivery to households.
The law also states that not all water systems located within the boundaries of municipal
lands belong to municipalities. Some of these properties are either owned by the state or
privately. Although 3.1 Article stipulates that the LEAs would transfer the ownership of
the state-owned water systems in municipal lands to the respective municipalities, it does
not set a timeline for their handover. Decision-making on this issue is left to the
discretion of respective LEAs.
Another problem is that municipalities actually do not have sufficient water infrastructure
in their lands. Azerbaijan’s local self-government was established after the lands formerly
owned by the state and kolkhozes (a form of collective farms in the USSR) were
privatized. In the aftermath of the privatization, there were left few water systems without
ownership. Municipalities thus have inherited pieces of lands mostly devoid of significant
water infrastructure.69
The data from Azerbaijan’s rural regions indicate that the existing ambiguities in the
assignment of this particular competency have a direct impact on the water use in the
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country’s villages. Lack of access to drinking water is a major problem in many of
Azerbaijan’s villages. The problems in the provision of potable water primarily stem
from the deficiencies of the existing infrastructure and the inability of most rural
communities to fix these deficiencies within their own means. 29 percent of Azerbaijan's
rural population does not have access to potable water.70 This is higher than in
Azerbaijan's two neighbors, Armenia and Georgia, where 7 and 4 percents of their
respective rural populations experience the similar problem. 75 percent of the
Azerbaijanis in villages are not connected to a centralized water supply. Only 47 percent
of Armenia’s and 33 percent of Georgia’s rural residents have the same problem. A 2011
survey by the Support for Economic Initiatives in 20 municipalities in 3 regions of
Azerbaijan indicates that 5600 (72 percent) of 7900 households in these municipalities
did not have a direct access to potable water.71 The average distance to the closest water
source in 17 of 20 villages was over 300 meters.72
Clearly, the legislative problems are not the only cause of the drinking water problem in
villages. In less developed rural regions of the country, the vast investment needs cannot
simply be addressed with the limited funds of municipalities. Given the weak tax base
and lack of access to credit in villages, their full control of water resources in their
territory will not be a panacea to serious shortcomings of the potable water supply.
However, it is important to establish effective institutions in communities, without which
it is impossible to ensure accountability of local authorities in the provision of local
public services. When such a simple question as “Who is responsible for which service?”
cannot be clearly answered, then the quality of service delivery cannot be expected to
exceed the level of mediocrity.
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Similarly, the unclear division of responsibilities locally affects the quality of the state
investments in communities. Municipalities are often disengaged from the decisionmaking over and implementation of the state programs related to water facilities in their
territories. Anecdotal evidence from municipalities demonstrates at least four problems
with the state-managed investment projects involving the construction and improvement
of the local water systems. First, there is no public oversight on how the state funds are
spent. The institutions that carry out these projects rarely make their financial details
available to the public. However, this problem is not specific to the water-related
investment projects. The government spending in Azerbaijan is one of the least
transparent in the global rankings. Second, the state-managed projects in local
communities are usually less efficient. For instance, the comparison of the state and
municipally managed water projects in Tartar and Aghjabadi indicate that in terms of
accessibility, municipally constructed water facilities are more tailored the needs and
circumstances of each area than those by the state.73 Third, municipalities oftentimes
cannot afford to maintain the newly built infrastructure in their territories. As a result, the
infrastructure usually ends up in the control of the state institutions, or state associated
companies. Finally, when these projects are done without community engagement, there
is little sense of ownership of their outcome.

Summary
The examination of the formal framework of municipal functions and competencies
demonstrated a multiplicity of problems that adversely impact the effectiveness of
Azerbaijan’s local self-government. Some of these problems pertain to the design of local
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self-government, while others are the result of asymmetric relations between the central
and local governments.
The constitutional and legislative basis of the local self-government is flawed, because it
fails to fully encompass the principles and requirements of democratic decentralization.
The dichotomy of the constitutional definition of local government is the starting point of
the consequent contradictions and ambiguities in the local self-government legislation.
The most consequential shortcoming of the constitution (with respect to local
government) is that it does not provide effective safeguards against the central
government’s infringement on municipal authority.
Although the Law on Municipal Status recognizes the citizens’ right to local selfgovernment, it does not create a viable framework for their exercise of this right. The
document enumerates a limited number of municipal competencies; however, it does not
ensure full and exclusive municipal authority over them. Instead, by adding the caveat
that municipalities can initiate programs in the areas that are not covered by the state
programs, it limits the municipal discretion. The law is vague on issues that fall under the
authority of both municipalities and the LEAs. Where it states municipal duties in
relatively clear terms, it fails to specify the formal mechanisms of their implementation.
Other laws do not clear up the confusion, either.
The greatest challenge to local self-government is the LEA control of many
competencies, which have also been granted to municipalities under the Law on Status of
Municipalities. The heads of the LEAs have more authority in local affairs on account of
their stronger position within Azerbaijan’s centralized political system and greater
32

financial resources. The LEAs perform the functions, which are usually done by mid and
upper tier elected sub-national authorities in devolved countries. In this respect, their
involvement in local and regional development is necessary, given Azerbaijan’s singletier municipal system. However, their engagement in local matters, even those as distant
and localized as street lightening, minimizes the utility of municipal authority.
The municipal role in local economic development is minimal, primarily due to their
limited financial resources. However, another major reason for this situation is that the
central government’s local and regional development policy heavily relies on the LEAs
and is exclusive of municipal involvement in policy design or implementation. A closer
examination of two social development competencies of municipalities demonstrated that
while in cities another state institution controls communal services to apartment houses
instead of municipalities, in villages, an incomplete legislative framework has paralyzed
effective drinking water provision by municipalities.
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3. Revenues of Local Self-Government: Sufficient and
Sustainable?
Introduction
This section examines the current state of municipal finances in Azerbaijan to find out
whether their revenues are adequate and their revenue sources are diversified enough.
Ideally, local authorities should have an access to a mixture of taxes, intergovernmental
grants and credit to be able to finance their services and capital needs. The availability of
raw data from 16 Azerbaijan municipalities allows a systematic investigation of the
revenue problem in the country’s local self-government. The section begins with a brief
overview of the formal framework of municipal finances. Then it provides a detailed
analysis of municipal finances and revenue sources. The final section gives a summary of
the major findings.

Formal Framework of Municipal Finances
The constitution and a number of laws of Azerbaijan regulate the financial basis of local
self-government. Article 144 of the Constitution endows municipalities with the power to
impose local taxes and duties to meet their expenditure needs. Articles 31-32 of the Law
of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Budget System provides formal guarantees for the
independence of municipalities in making their budget decisions and prohibits
interference of the legislative and executive branches in their budget activities. The Law
on Status of Municipalities addresses different aspects of municipal finances in Section
V, which lays down the specifics of “economic basis of local-self government.” Among
other things, this law defines the sources of local revenues and the mechanisms of local
taxation, the management of municipal properties, etc.
34

Municipal revenue sources are listed in the Tax Code and the Law on Local (Municipal)
Taxes and Fees of Azerbaijan. Under these laws, municipalities can impose the following
taxes and fees. The local taxes are:74
-

Land taxes on private individuals,

-

Property taxes on private individuals,75

-

Mining tax on construction materials of local importance,

-

Taxes on the profits of municipally owned enterprises.

The local levies are:
-

Levy on posting of street advertisements in the municipal owned territories,
buildings and other premises,

-

Levy on disposal and letting of the municipal property,

-

Levy on fixed and mobile commerce, public catering and other services in the
territories under ownership of municipalities,

-

Levy on hotels, sanatoria and health resorts, and persons providing tourist
services in the territories under ownership of municipalities,

-

Levy on parked cars in specialized parkings owned by legal and physical persons
in the municipal territories.

Under the Law on Budget System, the central government can provide municipalities
with additional financial aid. Article 32.2.2 of this law states that municipalities can
receive subsidies and subventions from the state budget if they are not able to finance
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local socio-economic development programs. The constitution and other laws also
require that the central government earmark funds for each additional expenditure
responsibility transferred to municipalities. Currently, the only type of intergovernmental
transfers used in Azerbaijan is subsidies, or general purpose grants.
There is no legal barrier to municipal borrowing, but formal mechanisms of taking a loan
have not been clarified. As a result, municipalities came to rely on their annual budgets to
finance some of their investment needs. There are successful examples of local
government financing schemes in some Eastern European countries, which could inform
the design of a similar system in Azerbaijan. Some developing countries, where local
elected authorities have a greater role in local development, provide them with credit
through specialized institutions. For example, Poland’s National Economy Bank provides
loans for local government’s development programs.76

Problem of Funding
Compared to Azerbaijan’s rapidly growing state revenues, the municipal finances
experienced serious fluctuation in the past years. The share of municipal revenues in the
consolidated state budget steadily dwindled between 2002 and 2010. The country’s oil
boom from 2005 onwards led to a drastic rise in the public revenues, but municipal
income was almost halved between 2007 and 2010. The sharp fall in municipal revenues
occurred due to a temporary ban on the sale of municipal lands between 2007 and 2009,
depriving municipalities of their major, but unsustainable revenue source for a while. In
the pre-ban period, the revenues from the sale of lands accounted for 40-70 percent of
total municipal revenues.77 The financial-economic crisis of 2009 also aggravated the
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revenue problem, primarily affecting the local property taxes. Since most residents of
Azerbaijan’s rural municipalities rely heavily on the remittances of their family members
working in Russia, the crisis particularly impacted the budgets of village municipalities
by decreasing their tax receipts.
Table 1: Comparing municipal and state revenues, AZN, 2002-2010.
Years

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Local (m)

12.8

11.1

17.6

24.3

33.0

50.0

43.0

26.7

28.9

State (bn)

0.9

1.2

1.5

2.0

3.9

6.0

10.8

10.3

11.4

Local r-s as a
share of the
state r-s

1.4

0.7

1.2

1.2

0.9

0.8

0.4

0.3

0.3

Source: http://www.budget.az/budget/

As a partial solution to the revenue problem, some authors have suggested that the central
government raise the amount of intergovernmental transfers to help municipalities cover
their essential expenditure needs. Despite the calls, the central government has not
prioritized the tool of financial aid to bolster municipal budgets. As is seen from Table 2,
the amount of intergovernmental transfers reduced as the share of the total state
expenditures.
Table 2: Comparing the state grants and municipal revenues, 2002-2009.
Years
Revenues,
AZN MM
Transfers, AZN
MM
Transfers, %
of state
expenditures

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

12.8

11.1

17.6

24.3

33.0

50.0

43.0

26.7

5.0

1.0

2.0

2.0

3.0

3.5

3.5

3.5

0.54

0.30

0.13

0.10

0.08

0.06

0.03

0.03

Source: The State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan Republic, http://www.stat.gov.az/.
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Case of 16 Municipalities: General Picture
The EPF data indicates that the problem of funding is real and it impacts municipalities in
very diverse ways. Most municipalities reviewed in this study do not have economic,
social or environmental development programs. Only three of seven city municipalities,
Mingechevir, Gabala and Gusar, and one of the eight village municipalities, Garabork,
have a development program in one or more areas of local economy, social development,
social protection or environmental protection. The lack of local government programs is
likely the symptom of a number of problems, including the unclear assignment of
municipal powers and responsibilities, their inadequate administrative capacity, and their
weak financial position. The analysis of municipal budgets reveals that the shortage of
funding is one of the major causes of the near-absence of local development schemes.
Municipal revenues, as a rule, fall short of their initial projections, or put differently,
operate with a negative budget variance. As is seen from Table 3, this problem exists in
both urban and rural municipalities. The actual level of revenues did not approximate the
forecasted ones in cities, except for Mingachevir. In Mingachevir’s case, a windfall of
AZN 140,000 in the form of government grant contributed to a positive budget variance.
The gap between forecasted and actual revenues is very high in the rest of the cities,
excluding Gusar. A similar trend can also be observed in rural municipalities. In villages
like Aran, Deller Ceyir and Deller Dashbulag, the difference is particularly visible.
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Table 3: Forecasted and actual total revenues of municipalities for 2011, AZN.
Municipality
Cities
Mingachevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala
Villages
Garabork
Nadirkand
Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller Dashbulag
Khatinli
Garakhanli
Orta Laki

Forecasted total revenue

Actual total revenue

285,000
300,000
237,400
137,000
71,500
121,400
411,700

369,900
199,500
166,500
98,200
68,800
65,400
31,700

27,600
12,159
24,000
12,355
23,000
8,200
2,500
3,200
-

28,200
13,911
11,400
8,859
8,500
3,950
3,550
3,094
16,926

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

Municipalities generally spend the largest portion of their revenues on a limited range of
budget items, mainly because the total sum of municipal revenues is very small. As a
rule, administrative costs top the list of expenditures. In 4 of 7 city municipalities, the
operational expenses make up over half of the total spending. The median share of
administrative outlay in the expenditures of urban municipalities is 53 percent. The
municipalities of Gabala and Gusar spend almost their entire budgets to meet their
expenditure needs, respectively 92 and 74 percent.
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Table 4: Share of administrative expenses in the total budgets of city municipalities in
2011.
Municipality

Total expenditure, AZN

Mingechevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala

366.393
199.5
163.9
98.2
53.3
66.2
31.7

Administrative
expenses, AZN
154.303
86.6
87.3
25.1
39.2
39.8
29.1

Admin. costs as a share
of the total, %
33
43
53
26
74
60
92

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

Table 5 includes the costs associated with the salaries of municipal employees (and
members) and mandatory fees to the State Social Protection Fund (the state pension
scheme) in 9 village municipalities. The figures indicate that administrative costs in the
villages are much higher compared to the cities. The median share of wages and the
insurance fees in the total spending of rural municipalities is approximately 52.8 percent
(the mean is 47.4 percent). The number is as high as 61.6 percent in Khatinli.
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Table 5: Share of salaries in the total expenditures of village municipalities in 2011, AZN.
Municipality
Garabork

Total
expenditure
22,100

Number of
employees
3

Nadirkand

13,901

2

Aran
Boluslu

24,000
8,859

1
2

Deller Ceyir

8,500

2

Deller Dashbulag
Khatinli

8,200
78
3550

3
3

Garakhanli

3,196

3

Orta Laki

16,947

3

Administrative
expenses
9,180 (salaries) +
2,020 (SSPF)
6,282 (salaries) +
1,521 (SSPF)
1,700 (salaries)
4,119 (salaries) +
974 (SSPF)
2,805 (salaries) +
250 (SSPF)
1,574 (salaries)
1,970 (salaries)+
218 (SSPF)
1,703 (salaries) +
100 (SSPF)
7,772 (salaries)+
1,183 (SSPF)

Median
Mean

Admin. costs as a
share of the total
50.7
56.1
7.1
57.45
35.9
19.2
61.6
56.4
52.8
52.8
47.4

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

A relatively high share of salaries in municipal budgets is evidently due to the scantiness
of available funds. The comparison of the mean wage of municipal employees in the 8
municipalities with the monthly average of the districts (rayons), in which they are
located, shows that the salary of municipal employees are either below the regional
averages, or not all employees are compensated for their work. As shown in Table 6, only
one-fourth of village municipalities, namely Nadirkand and Garabork have higher
average wages than their regional equivalents. In 3 villages, Khatinli, Garakhanli and
Deller Dashbulag, the mean wage is not only low, but is below the official poverty
threshold, AZN 93.5.
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Table 6: Comparing monthly wages of village municipalities and the regional averages,
AZN, 2011-2012.
Municipality
Nadirkand
Garabork
Boluslu
Aran
Deller Ceyir
Khatinli
Garakhanli
Deller Dashbulag

Monthly wage per employee,
AZN, 2011
261.8
255
171.6
141.7
116.9
54.7
47.3
43.7

Average monthly wage in the
region, AZN, 2012
210.1
223.5
210.1
209.0
239.8
223.1
223.1
239.8

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

The two budget items mentioned above only comprise a portion of municipalities’
overhead costs. When one includes other relevant expenses (e.g. the maintenance of the
office, or membership fees), the administrative costs become even higher. For instance,
Boluslu spends the remainder of its budget (18.2 percent) on office costs, printing,
membership fees, donations to the army, and banking fees. Likewise, Deller Ceyir spends
28.8 percent of its budget on membership and administrative costs such as office repairs,
subscription and membership fees, the purchase of fuel, and donations to the army.
Internal auditing costs and other organizational fees comprise 13.6 percent of Garabork’s,
13.4 percent of Khatinli’s and 11.1 percent of Garakhanli’s budgets. Office-related costs
and fees make up 4.4 percent of Nadirkand’s budget.
Almost everywhere, included in this sample, the largest non-administrative expenditure
item is public works, in particular, the renovation of municipal territories (e.g. roads) and
housing-communal spending. Most municipalities have listed their capital costs under the
title of public works, or public works and housing-communal expenses. All cities, with
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the exception of Mingachevir, spent over three-fourth of their funds on administrative
and infrastructure-related costs in 2011.
Table 7: Percentage of city municipalities’ spending on administration, infrastructure
and communal services in 2011.
Municipality

Administrative costs,
2011

Mingachevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala

33
43
53
26
74
60
92

Renovation-housingcommunal services,
2011
20.7
28.9
24.3
56.0
13.1
24.5
4.7

As a percentage of
the total, 2011
53.7
71.9
77.3
82.0
87.1
84.5
96.7

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

As Table 8 indicates, a similar trend exists in the villages. The spending of rural
municipalities on the salaries, fees and office related costs and limited infrastructure
repairs absorb most of their budgets.
Table 8: Percentage of village municipalities’ spending on salaries/SSPF payments,
infrastructure and communal services in 2011.
Municipality

Garabork
Nadirkand
Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller Dashbulag
Khatinli
Garakhanli
Orta Laki

Salaries/payments to
the SSPF, 2011
50.7
56.1
7.1
57.45
35.9
19.2
61.6
56.4
52.8

Renovation-housingcommunal services,
2011
17.1
29.1
39.6
24.3
15.8
16.6
16
31.1
21.9

As a percentage of the
total, 2011
67.8
85.2
46.7
81.75
51.7
35.8
77.6
87.5
74.7

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

Lack of funding has direct implications for the state of infrastructure in municipal
territories. Local roads are an important component of local infrastructure and also a
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basic determinant of local development. The Law on Status of Municipalities states that
municipalities are responsible for maintaining and managing local roads. It is evident
from Table 9 that the local road systems of most municipalities are in need of repair. The
table compares the overall length of local roads and the length of roads needing
improvement in individual municipalities. The figures suggest that the problem is as
significant in cities with relatively high revenues as it is in villages with fewer resources.
Among cities, Mingachevir and Khachmaz have the longest unrepaired road systems. The
entire road system of 5 of 8 villages, Aran, Deller Dashbulag, Boluslu, Garakhanli, and
Garabork, need repairs, too. In 3 municipalities, Siyazan, Salyan and Gusar, roads are not
under the municipal authority.
Table 9: Condition of local roads, 2011.
Municipality

Mingechevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala

79

Length of
Roads, km
570
144
12
28.5

Roads
needing
repair, km
270
15
130
15
1
5.1

Municipality

Length of
Roads, km

Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller Dashbulag
Nadirkand
Garabork
Garakhanli
Khatinli
Orta Laki

191
26
40
22
18
11
20
18
43

Roads
needing
repair, km
186.5
20
28
22
3
8
15
6
10

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

The potable water supply systems of some municipalities are in need of improvement,
too. Not all municipalities in this sample have provided the data on the water
infrastructure within their territories, which is why it is difficult to assess the scale of
problem in various municipalities. However, in those municipalities that made the
information available, the water pipes are generally in unsatisfactory condition. The
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problem is more evident in cities like Mingechevir, Khachmaz and Lankaran. However,
as the previous section indicated, the general state of the drinking water systems in the
country’s rural regions is also inadequate.
Table 10: Condition of drinking water infrastructure in municipalities, 2011.
Municipality

Mingechevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala

Length of
water pipes,
km
175
35
130
50
73
116
18.3

Pipes
needing
repair, km
150
0.9
120
n/a
n/a
96
3.5

Municipality

Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller Dashbulag
Nadirkand
Garabork
Garakhanli
Khatinli
Orta Laki

Length of
water pipes,
km
191
15
10
-

Pipes
needing
repair, km
186.5
4
4
-

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

Revenue Sources
Own-Revenues

The data is also informative about the current state of revenue sources, on which
municipalities depend. A major problem in most municipalities is that a significant
percentage of their population does not pay their taxes on time. Approximately 30 percent
of the population in the cities has not paid off their local taxes. The situation is worse in
rural municipalities, where about 40 percent of the residents have tax debt to
municipalities. As the decentralization literature indicates, in developing countries the tax
base of local government is generally weak. In Azerbaijan, this is particularly visible,
because the oil-related businesses, which are the driver of the country’s economy, are
concentrated in and around Baku, the capital. As will be discussed later, the socio-
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economic reforms of the recent years have not significantly increased the economic
opportunities outside of Baku, particularly, in the rural regions of Azerbaijan.
The sale and lease of municipal lands are the predominant source of revenue in many
municipalities. Almost the entire budgets of Siyazan and Gusar were financed through
the sale or lease of their lands in 2010-2011. Land sales and leases account for
approximately 30-60 percent of revenues in cities of Salyan, Mingachevir, Lankaran, and
Gabala. The only exception to the rule is Khachmaz, which saw a sharp decline in its
revenues from this non-tax revenue source in 2011. Interestingly, all cities, excluding
Khachmaz and Lankaran saw a slight increase in the share of this revenue source in their
total budgets. The dependence of most municipalities on land sale puts them in a very
vulnerable position, due to unsustainability of this revenue source. Most village
municipalities, too, saw an increase of revenues from sale and lease of lands in their
budgets from 2010 to 2011. Municipalities that have larger budgets such as Garabork and
Aran are also more dependent on this revenue source. A notable exception in this respect
is Nadirkand which has the third largest budget, but sales and leases account for slightly
over 13 percent of its revenues. The villages of Khatinli and Garakhanli both have the
smallest budgets and the least share of receipts from land sale and lease in their revenues.
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Table 11: Revenues from sale and lease of municipal lands, 2010-2011.
Municipality

Cities
Mingechevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala
Villages
Garabork
Nadirkand
Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller
Dashbulag
Khatinli
Garakhanli
Orta Laki

Revenues, in
thousand AZN,
2011

Sale and Lease of
Municipal Lands,
in thousand AZN
(%)

Revenues, in
thousand AZN,
2010

Sale and Lease of
Municipal Lands,
in thousand AZN
(%)

369.9
199.5
166.5
98.2
68.8
65.4
31.7

120.885 (32.7)
172.8 (86.6)
11.6 (7)
57.3 (58.4)
59.5 (86.5)
23.9 (36.5)
9.4 (29.7)

344.0
121.4
96.3
125.7
56.0
65.6
29.1

101.343 (29.5)
92.5 (76.2)
56.9 (59.1)
48.3 (38.4)
47.4 (84.6)
27.9 (42.5)
4.6 (15.8)

28,200
13,911
11,400
8,859
8,500
3,950

20,200 (71.63)
1,838 (13.21)
9,000 (78.95)
1,734 (19.57)
1,700 (20)
1,313 (33.24)

16,700
18,537
22,400
9,806
11,200
5,001

5,600 (33.53)
0,700 (3.77)
12,600 (56.25)
0,809 (8.25)
1,370 (12.23)
0,867 (17.34)

3,550
3,094
16,926

28 (0.79)
0,0 (0)
3,781 (22.34)

3,034
3,554
15,381

0,028 (0.92)
0,468 (13.17)
2,228 (14.49)

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

Both city and village municipalities derive a larger portion of their tax revenues from
taxes on private lands. 5 of 7 city municipalities and 8 of 9 village municipalities receive
the biggest share of their tax revenues in the form of land tax. The budgets of rural
municipalities are more dependent on this type of tax, due to the fact that most of them
cannot levy property tax.
The findings of this research indicate that municipalities, in general, are unable to tap into
the potential of personal property tax. Property tax is considered the most appropriate
source of local government revenue; however, mostly for reasons beyond municipal
control, their share in municipal budgets is low. For instance, houses and apartments
often lack an inventory valuation certificate, without which municipalities cannot levy the
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property tax. One estimate puts the number of unregistered houses in the suburbs of
Baku, the capital city, at 450 thousand.80 There are also cases when owners illicitly
register the value of their property as below AZN 5000, because properties that are priced
under this amount are exempt from personal property tax under the Tax Code.81
In 4 of 7 cities, municipalities collect practically no personal property tax. The
municipality of Khachmaz is a noticeable exception in that over 22 percent of its
revenues flow from personal property tax. Khachmaz had experienced a sharp decline of
its revenues from the sale and lease of lands between 2010 and 2011, but an increased
property tax collection compensated for some of the financial loss in 2011 fiscal year.
Unlike many other municipalities, Khachmaz has apparently substituted the older,
inefficient method of taxation on the inventory value of property for the taxation
mechanism based on the market value of property. The municipality has registered the
properties in its territories and established a new accounting system to increase the
efficiency of tax collection.82 There is limited information available on the method
employed in the city, that’s why further investigation of the subject could provide
valuable insight for the majority of municipalities in Azerbaijan. A mining tax is an
important source of revenue only in two municipalities, namely Mingachevir and
Garabork. Understandably, it is not a reliable tax source for many municipalities that do
not produce construction materials.

48

Table 12: Revenues of municipalities from three sources: land tax on private individuals,
property tax on private individuals, and mining tax on construction materials, 2011.
Municipality

Cities
Mingechevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala
Villages
Garabork
Nadirkand
Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller
Dashbulag
Khatinli
Garakhanli
Orta Laki

83

Revenues, in
thousand AZN,
2011

Land tax on
private
individuals, in
thousand AZN (%)

Property tax on
private
individuals, in
thousand AZN (%)

Mining tax , in
thousand AZN
(%)

369.9
199.5
166.5
98.2
68.8
65.4
31.7

3.258 (0.9)
16.6 (8.3)
9.7 (5.8)
15.2 (15.5)
3.7 (5.4)
14.7 (22.5)
9.8 (30.9)

0 (0)
1.6 (0.8)
36.9 (22.2)
12.9 (13.1)
0.6 (0.9)
10.0 (15.3)
0 (0)

22.950 (6.2)
0.4 (0.2)
0 (0)
6.2 (6.3)
0 (0)
0.2 (0.3)
0 (0)

28,200
13,911
11,400
8,859
8,500
3,950

3,500 (12.4)
2,669 (19.2)
600 (5.3)
5,750 (64.9)
3,700 (43.5)
748 (18.9)

1,200 (4.26)
180 (2.03)
1,000 (11.77)
-

0
8,404 (60.4)
0
-

3,550
3,094
16,926

2,355 (66.3)
1,779 (57.5)
7,831 (46.3)

3,529 (20.85)

-

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011
Intergovernmental Transfers

Although the share of intergovernmental transfers seems significant in some
municipalities relative to other revenue sources, in absolute terms, they are
inconsequential. To put these numbers in perspective, the monthly minimum wage in
Azerbaijan is AZN 116 (2013), in other words, the state allocations to most village
municipalities do not even allow them to hire a person at a minimum wage, let alone help
them cover their expenditure needs. The situation is not better in most cities, either. The
only cities that received partially sufficient grants were Mingachevir and Khachmaz.
When one compares these numbers to the annual allocations made to the LEAs, it
becomes obvious that these figures are really low. For instance, the LEA of Mingachevir
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received AZN 18 million from the state budget in addition to its own revenues at AZN
9.2 million in 2012.84 Lankaran’s city administration had total revenue of AZN 30
million, of which over 17 million was transfers from the state budget.85 In other words,
Mingachevir’s municipality received 130 times less money than its LEA from the state,
while Lankaran’s 2100 times.
Also the criteria, on the basis of which the amount of allocations to each municipality is
decided is unclear. For instance, Lankaran, the major city of the southern region, receives
approximately four times less money than Khachmaz, which has fewer inhabitants. The
same can be said of rural municipalities, all of which are assigned approximately the
same amount of money, despite their differences of population.
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Table 13: Comparing the state grants and total municipal revenues, 2011.
Municipality
Mingachevir
Siyazan
Khachmaz
Salyan
Gusar
Lankaran
Gabala
Median
Mean
Villages
Garabork
Nadirkend
Aran
Boluslu
Deller Ceyir
Deller Dashbulag
Khatinli
Garakhanli
Orta Laki
Median
Mean

Grants-in-aid,
thousand AZN (%)
140 (37.9)
4.1 (2.1)
36.0 (21.6)
6.6 (6.7)
4.0 (5.8)
8.1 (12.4)
3 (9.5)
9.5%
13.7%

Total Municipal
Revenues, AZN
369.9
199.5
166.5
98.2
68.8
65.4
31.7

Population

1.3 (4.6)
1.0 (7.2)
1.8 (15.8)
1.2 (13.6)
1.8 (21.2)
1.0 (25.3)
1.2 (33.8)
1.3 (42.0)
1.8 (10.6)
15.8%
19.3%

28,200
13,911
11,400
8,859
8,500
3,950
3,550
3,094
16,926

3,506
1,530
7,099
2,985
5,530
2,253
3,186
3,251
6,302

99,126
16,902
39,594
38,457
23,990
53,321
14,110

Source: EPF Municipal Performance Management System, 2010-2011

Summary
The findings of this section indicated that Azerbaijan’s municipalities operate on an
extremely tight budget and the volatility of some of their main revenue sources makes
their financial situation even more precarious.
The dynamic of municipal revenues shows that municipalities did not benefit from the
economic and public sector growth in Azerbaijan over the last decade. Despite a decline
in municipal revenues after 2007, the central government did not provide additional funds
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to bridge the fiscal gap. In fact, the share of intergovernmental grants in the state budget
went down significantly during the same period.
Most municipalities lack development programs, which diminishes their role in local
governance. The actual revenues of municipalities are usually much lower than the
forecasted ones, which can be attributed to their weak administrative capacity in tax
collection, tax debt of many citizens and other factors (e.g. lack of properties’ inventoried
value). The single major expenditure item is the operational expenses of municipal
authority. Even so, municipalities provide low salaries to their employees, which almost
surely affect the quality of workforce.
Municipalities have serious infrastructure needs, which they have to finance through their
budget expenditures. More infrastructure spending leads to less service spending. In
normal circumstances, municipalities should be able to borrow in order to finance their
long-term investments. This option is not feasible in the case of Azerbaijan’s weak
municipal system.
Municipalities primarily rely on their own revenue sources, due to limitedness of the
intergovernmental grants. However, the examination of municipal funding options
reveals that they are of limited importance and unsustainable. Sale and lease of lands
account for an important portion of municipal revenues. One-off revenues from sale of
lands are clearly unreliable. Two sustainable sources of revenue, land and property taxes
have a relatively small share in municipal budgets. Especially, the untapped potential of
property tax can significantly improve the fiscal capacity of municipalities, if the
problems pertaining to property appraisal are resolved.
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4. Discussion
The findings of the previous two sections indicated that Azerbaijan’s municipalities
suffer from chronic deficit of powers and revenues. The current state of municipal
authority, therefore, is not conducive to effective local governance. Despite the fact that
these problems hinder institutionalization of local self-government, the central
government has not come up with a clear strategy to tackle them. In view of the
importance of successful decentralization to good governance, the persistent
shortcomings of municipal powers and resources raise three questions:
-

Why has the central government failed to address these problems?

-

What factors can induce the government to reform the local self-government?

-

What changes are necessary to improve municipal powers and funding?

Obstacles to Good Decentralization Policy
Although Azerbaijan’s last two governments (the father and son Aliyevs) accepted the
general rationale for political decentralization by granting municipalities a constitutional
status and signing the European Charter of Local Self-Government, a number of factors
appear to have slowed the formulation of an adequate decentralization strategy. As
Section 1 indicated, the main benefits of decentralization that motivate governments to
devolve powers are its potential political (e.g. legitimacy), economic (e.g. efficiency),
and democratic (e.g. participation, accountability) gains. To better understand the current
state of weak local self-government, one, therefore, should ask whether these benefits
provide enough incentives for the government of Azerbaijan to commit to empowering
local self-government.
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Until recently, the answer of this question was more “no” than “yes”. The government
put the subject of democratic decentralization on the back burner amid favorable
economic and political conditions of the mid-2000s. Political incentives for democratic
decentralization were weak, because the challenges to semi-authoritarian rule of the
incumbent president Ilham Aliyev were minimal. The key to his stable presidency was
the oil-driven, rapid economic growth in the second half of the 2000s. In fact, most
observers share the view that the economic rise came at the expense of Azerbaijan’s
nascent democratic institutions. Azerbaijan’s oil windfall also reduced economic
incentives for decentralization. The increased revenues from oil production boosted the
public spending, slowed the pace of public sector reform, and adversely impacted the
efficiency of public expenditures.
However, the government may have to revisit its policy of non-engagement with local
self-government due to the changing realities in the country. The large and inefficient
public sector is becoming a liability in light of the projected decline in oil revenues, on
which the state budget heavily depends. There is also growing public discontent about the
quality of government policies at the local level. The recent unrest in Azerbaijan’s two
regions, Guba and Ismayilli, demonstrates that the dissatisfaction with local authorities
may easily transform into a much greater challenge to the country’s political stability. In
addition to economic and democratic factors, political considerations may also incline the
government to modify its policy towards democratic decentralization. Calls to reform the
political system of Azerbaijan may become costlier to ignore altogether, as the president
seeks third term, the legality of which is disputed by the opposition parties and
international organizations.
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Rising Cost of the Status Quo
“Bloated” Public Sector

Azerbaijan’s large public sector will become difficult to sustain as revenues from oil, the
main revenue source of the state budget, are expected to decline in the coming years.
Azerbaijan’s oil production, by most estimates, peaked in 2010 and is set to reduce
significantly in the foreseeable future. As the share of oil revenues in the state budget
shrinks, the costs of maintaining a big government become more burdensome. The
reform of local self-government and gradual transfer of some state responsibilities to the
lower level may reduce some of the adverse implications of this economic change
looming in the horizon.
Azerbaijan has traditionally had a larger government employment compared to its
neighbors Armenia and Georgia. In the last two decades, the share of public employment
in the economy declined, but still remains very high. The percentage of the workforce
employed in the state sector hovered above 30 percent since 1999 and stood at 36 percent
in 2008. Unlike Armenia and Georgia, where economic problems led to the cutback on
the public sector, Azerbaijan experienced a reverse trend since 2003. Azerbaijan’s public
employment increased hand in hand with the country’s growing oil exports.
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Table 14: Share of public sector employment in total
employment in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, expressed as
a percentage, 1995-2008.
Years
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Armenia
49.8
38.9
37.1
30.3
27.4
26.5
24.8
25.8
23.3
21.1
19.8
19.6
19.3
18.8

Azerbaijan
56.1
51
46.5
46.2
36.2
33.6
33.4
32.0
31.5
31.7
31.9
32.0
36.3
36.4

Georgia
42.4
30.1
28.7
34.6
31.3
25.1
n/a
23.5
24
22.8
23
20.6
n/a
n/a

Source: LABORSTA Databasa, Public Sector Employment
Statistics, International Labor Organization, quoted in Guliyev,
Farid. "Chapter 9: Political Elites in Azerbaijan." In Challenges of
the Caspian Resource Boom. Domestic Elites and Policy-Making,
edited by, Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines, 117-130.

As the country’s oil production went up over time, the state budget became increasingly
dependent on the direct transfers from the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, the country’s
sovereign oil-wealth fund. The share of oil transfers in the state revenues of 2012 was
slightly over 60 percent, and is forecasted to remain the same in 2013. 86 In addition to the
funds from the SOFAZ, 41 percent of the state tax revenues are projected to come from
the oil and gas sector in 2013.87There is already a downward trend in Azerbaijan’s oil
production, which has made the budget’s resource dependency particularly precarious. In
2011, oil output fell by 10.3 percent to 45.6 million tonnes.88 Due to shrinking oil and
gas production, the country’s economic growth slowed to 0.1 percent after years of rapid
economic expansion.89 Although the economy rebounded in 2012 thanks to the
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stabilization of the production level, the data from the first quarter of 2013 indicates a
decline of oil exports compared to the previous year.90

By reforming the institutional capacity of municipalities, the central government could
optimize efficiency of public services, thereby reducing the public expenditures.
Research also indicates that decentralization can moderate the effects of “resource curse”
in rentier economies.91 Therefore, the reform of the local government system is a long
term investment, which can facilitate the country’s sustainable development.
Poor Public Service Delivery

The public perception of the government’s resource allocation and program
implementation in the regions is generally negative. The top-down management of public
services and investment programs leads to inefficient and ineffective spending and
undermine the public trust in the state institutions. A survey conducted by the Center for
Regional Development in Azerbaijan (CRDA) and the Association for Civil Society
Development in Azerbaijan (ACSDA) to evaluate the results of the State Program on
Social-Economic Development of Regions for the Years of 2004-2008 is informative
about how the citizens see the outcome of the government’s development programs
outside of the capital city. Approximately 1,500 citizens participated in the survey, which
was held among the residents of 7 economic regions of Azerbaijan in 2008-2009. The
survey results suggest a general skepticism about the outcome of the state’s socioeconomic development programs between 2004 and 2008. Asked if the economic reforms
of the recent years satisfied them, more residents responded negatively than positively.
One third of the citizens found the reforms ineffective, whereas nearly 17 percent were
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content with their impact. A large portion of the interviewees, almost half of them did not
express any opinion on the subject. Interestingly, over half of the respondents of the
villages of Absheron, a region surrounding the capital city of Baku did not think the
economic reforms changed their life for the better. The percentage of the population
dissatisfied with the quality of reforms was around or over the 30 percent threshold in all
regions where the survey was conducted.
Table 15: Are you satisfied with the economic reforms in your region? (%)
Region
Absheron
Shaki-Zagatala
Ganja-Gazakh
Lankaran-Astara
Daglig-Shirvan
Aran
Guba-Khachmaz
Mean
Median

Yes
7
10
26
38
18
11
8
16.86
11

No
51
39
30
33
33
23
29
34
33

Difficult to answer
42
51
44
28
49
66
63
49
49

Source: CRDA and ACSDA survey, 2008-2009

Particularly interesting for the purpose of this study is that three in four Azerbaijanis (the
median) thought that the LEAs performed poorly or very poorly in their region. The
number of the unsatisfied citizens was particularly high in the economic regions of ShakiZagatala, Daghlig-Shirvan, Absheron, and Guba-Khachmaz. The only region where the
number of people favorably disposed towards the LEAs was more than those who
thought unfavorably of them was Aran. Only 3 percent of the respondents expressed a
favorable opinion about the way the LEAs carried out their responsibilities.
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Table 16: How would you evaluate the performance of the local executive
authority? (%)
Region
Absheron
Shaki-Zagatala
Ganja-Gazakh
Lankaran-Astara
Daglig-Shirvan
Aran
Guba-Khachmaz
Median
Mean

Good
3
1
4
16
3
21
3
3
7.29

Average
20
11
55
49
18
62
21
21
33.71

Poor/Very Poor
77
88
41
35
79
17
76
76
59

Source: CRDA and ACSDA survey, 2008-2009

In most regions, citizens are not satisfied with the municipal performance, either,
although municipalities are rated more favorably compared to the LEAs. 13 percent of
the population viewed municipalities positively as opposed to 3 percent who had a high
opinion of the LEAs. In the regions of Guba-Khachmaz, Daghlig-Shirvan and Aran, a
significant portion of the residents was favorably disposed towards municipal
administration. On the other hand, in Absheron and Shaki-Zagatala, over half of the
population was critical of local self-government. One of the reasons for lack of trust in
the institution of local self-government may be its minimal role in addressing the
problems of communities. As the discussion indicated, municipalities lack administrative
and political powers to make a meaningful contribution to local development in
Azerbaijan. Another cause of the general skepticism about municipalities could be the
general perception of municipalities as the subordinates of the LEAs. Currently, the latter
does not only interfere in the decision-making and intra-organizational matters of
municipalities, but also frequently influences the outcomes of the municipal elections in
the country. The reports of local and international election observers testify to LEAs’
systematic violation of election laws. 92
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Table 17: Are you satisfied with the performance of your municipality? (%)
Region
Absheron
Shaki-Zagatala
Ganja-Gazakh
Lankaran-Astara
Daglig-Shirvan
Aran
Guba-Khachmaz
Median
Mean

Yes
12
8
13
8
31
25
44
13
20.14

No
63
51
49
37
27
34
25
37
40.86

Difficult to Answer
25
41
38
55
42
41
31
41
39

Source: CRDA and ACSDA survey, 2008-2009

When asked to rank in order of importance the problematic factors to the regional
development (7 in total: unemployment, healthcare, education, the local executive
authority, municipality, corruption, energy and water supply), the residents of all regions
included the LEA in the top three, along with unemployment and corruption. One fifth of
all respondents mentioned the LEAs as a barrier to their region’s development. However,
a significant portion of the population also considers municipalities as an obstacle to local
development. Taking into account that corruption is also closely associated with the
public institutions of the country then it becomes obvious that the public perception of the
current system of local governance is highly negative.
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Table 18: Rank the obstacles to local development in order of importance. (%)
st

Region
Absheron

1
Corruption (36)

Shaki-Zagatala

Daglig-Shirvan

Unemployment
(31)
Unemployment
(29)
Unemployment
(38)
Corruption (36)

Aran

Corruption (30)

Guba-Khachmaz

Unemployment
(24)

Ganja-Gazakh
Lankaran-Astara

nd

rd

th

2
Unemployment
(29)
Corruption (21)

3
LEA (19)

4
Municipality (11)

LEA (18)

Healthcare (10)

Energy and Water
Provision (25)
LEA (21)

LEA (17)

Corruption (13)

Corruption (19)

Municipality (10)

Unemployment
(18)
LEA (24)

Municipality (9)
Municipality (11)

Municipality (19)

Corruption (15)

LEA (27)
Unemployment
(26)
LEA (20)

Source: CRDA and ACSDA survey, 2008-2009

Strong local institutions may positively influence the quality of the service delivery by
improving downward accountability of local decision-makers (e.g. via elections), and
transparency of and citizen engagement in local governance.
Threat of Political Instability

The recent protests against the abuses of power by the LEAs in two regions of Azerbaijan
shattered the illusion of stability under the deconcentrated system of governance.
Accountability and transparency deficit in local government was the major reason for the
unrest in Guba and Ismayilli. In May 2012, the residents of Guba, the country’s largest
city in the northern region, took to the streets demanding the resignation of the head of
the region’s local executive authority, after the governor supposedly made offensive
comments about the region’s population.93 In January 2013, in a similar development,
riots and protests hit another town of Azerbaijan, Ismayilli, against the local governor.
94

The government sent troops to restore order in both cities, but the president also

relieved both governors of their jobs.
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Many researchers attribute the unrest to corruption and limitless powers of local
executives.95 In the current political order, which is based on patron-client relations, the
governors have an important function. Accountable only to the president, they are tasked
with overseeing local development and ensuring political stability. Article 3.1 of the
Regulations stipulates that the head of the local executive authority is “personally
responsible before President” for performing his duties. Thus, the legislation holds the
individual holding the position responsible, rather than the institutional capacity, in which
he acts, for the implementation of the state policies. As a quid pro quo, the governors
have wide decision-making authority in matter concerning their districts, which they
often abuse. Municipalities, which represent local communities, have no influence over
the LEA decisions. Quite the contrary, as the latest CoE report quoted one mayor, “local
governments cannot take a breath without the approval of the executive body.”96
Empowering municipalities, as legitimate representatives of the citizens, would provide
additional safeguards against the misuse of power by bureaucrats in the LEAs. Effective
local self-government opens more channels for public participation in local decisionmaking and ensures more transparency in how local funds are spent.
Challenges to Government’s Legitimacy

The incumbent president is likely to run for a third term in office in the upcoming
October election after the controversial 2009 amendments to the constitution removed the
presidential term limit. As the government enters the uncharted territory of third term, it
may become more receptive to democratic reforms at the bottom of the political system
to boost its legitimacy. In legal terms, the current president is not eligible for another
consecutive tenure in office, because the amendments were made after he was elected a
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president.97 The decision to seek re-election would have implications for the government
both domestically and internationally. Domestically, it would intensify social and
political tensions, if the continued presidency of Aliyev is perceived as the maintenance
of the status quo. As the preceding discussion suggested the public perception of the
government policies in the regions outside of the capital is unsatisfactory. Internationally,
it would undermine the political reputation and democratic legitimacy of the current
government, especially, among the European partners. The only other head of state in the
Continent, who altered the constitution to remain in power in the Continent, is Alexander
Lukashenko of Belarus, who is often referred to as “Europe’s last dictator”. As the costs
of limiting democracy and resisting reforms both at the national and local levels
increases, the government may opt to improve local self-government as a quid pro quo
for maintaining the status quo in the center. The evidence from a number of authoritarian
countries indicates that the ruling regimes may tolerate democracy at the local level,
because they often see it as less threatening to their powers.98 The examples include
Brazil and Mexico in the 1980s and Morocco today.

The Way Forward
The study indicated that weak municipal powers and revenues have persisted due to a
combination of wrong policies and lack of political interest in democratic
decentralization. The government will have to modify its policy approach to local selfgovernment, if it wants to address these problems. A major shortcoming of the
government’s decentralization policy is that it does not define the central government’s
role in the strengthening of municipalities. The government has considered its job almost
done after it created the structures of local self-government. But political decentralization
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is a long term policy process, which requires a political commitment. The central
government should not remain a passive observer of local self-government evolution. The
government’s active political and administrative support to municipalities is central to the
development of their institutional capacity.
The reform of Azerbaijan’s local self-government should start by defining the role of
municipalities within the country’s political system and its local development. The
government needs to develop a comprehensive decentralization strategy that can
coherently reflect the mission of this nascent institution and the objectives it will serve to
achieve. The addressing of the problems studied in this paper should be done in the
context of a broader decentralization policy aimed at building functioning local
authorities in Azerbaijan and should be based on the conceptual and practical principles
of political decentralization, some of which were discussed at the beginning of this study.
One of these principles can be summarized as “finance follows function,” which denotes
that a clear framework of local government expenditure responsibilities must precede the
assignment of revenues and the amount of revenue must be adequate for each task
assigned to local self-government. The current distribution of functions and revenues
does not seem to take into account this rule, as neither the municipal responsibilities are
clear, nor the revenue sources adequate.
The functions, over which authority is transferred to municipalities, should be chosen
according to three considerations. First, only services that can be efficiently done by
municipalities (relative to the LEAs) should be transferred to them (e.g. street lightening,
garbage removal, etc.). Second, new responsibilities must not overwhelm the weaker
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administrative capacity of municipalities. Third, politically “less controversial” tasks
should be reserved to them in the early stage of the reform to reduce the intensity of
bureaucratic resistance to the change. It is important to add that the purpose of
decentralization is not to delegate numerous responsibilities to local elected authorities.
Rather, the rationale is to improve the management of public services, as it is stated in the
European Charter of Local Self-Government.
When municipalities are granted functions, they should be provided with sufficient
discretion to perform them. The review of the drinking water-related problems in rural
municipalities showed that even though the municipal role in the provision of water to
households in villages is formally recognized, the legislative and bureaucratic
impediments to the exercise of this prerogative have not been eliminated.
Municipal revenues should be adequate to their competencies. The current level of
financial resources available to them is so low that it does not cover a limited range of
tasks they do. Municipalities currently underutilize their own-tax revenues, mostly for
reasons beyond municipal control. For instance, obstacles to property tax collection are
mostly legal-bureaucratic and can be relatively easily addressed, if the central
government desires so. The weaker administrative capacity of municipalities also
undermines their revenue-raising ability.
When a service is delegated to municipalities, they should be able to rely on a stable and
predictable source of revenue. The higher the share of local taxes in their revenue
sources, the more effectively they can operate. The central government has a key role in
addressing the bureaucratic challenges to municipalities’ taxing authority and in
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improving their tax-raising potential. The government also needs to assign other local
taxes to municipalities, which pertain to their competencies. For instance, municipalities
are responsible for the maintenance of local roads, but they have not been assigned
vehicle tax, a relevant source of road infrastructure funding.
There are limits to local taxes, which almost always necessitate additional funding.
Municipalities receive a limited amount of grants from the center and have no access to
credit. The provision of intergovernmental grants to local authorities without the latter’s
adequate use of the full potential of its tax base can be damaging to the purpose of
decentralization. The fiscal equivalency principle states that communities should pay for
the services they consume. This may partly account for the government’s reluctance to
increase the amount of grants to municipalities. However, the government has failed to
address the problems that hinder municipalities’ effective use of their local revenue
sources.
However, an effective structuring of intergovernmental financing is essential to the long
term success of local self-government. Equally, access to credit is crucial to Azerbaijan’s
local development. To minimize the danger of moral hazard arising from the central
funding options, the government also should have in place effective regulatory
framework.
Municipalities’ partnership with the private sector and their establishment of their own
businesses are also important in terms of raising their economic role in local
development. Lifting the restriction on their commercial activities is necessary to unleash
municipalities’ potential for innovation.
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The problems this study has found in the design of Azerbaijan’s local self-government
are serious, but also fixable, if there is enough political will to address them. Until now,
there has been limited interest on the part of the government to fix them, as incentives of
the reform have not been strong enough. The changing political and economic situation in
the country may compel the government to reconsider the benefits of strong and
accountable local authorities. The earlier this decision is made, the better the outcome of
the reform would be. As Smoke puts it, “”Offloading functions to local governments in
times of central government crisis is far from a guarantee of better performance.”99
However, under a gloomy scenario, the government may do just that; delay the
implementation of the reform until it becomes a political necessity. Much depends on
how the government perceives the strengthening of municipal authority, a threat to its
powers or a trade-off, in which “more subtle and substantial gains will accrue to” it.100
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APPENDIX
Municipal functions and competencies under the Law on Status of
Municipalities
Social protection and social development
Preschool education, education, healthcare, and culture; the maintenance and use of
residential and nonresidential buildings; the organization of sanitation enterprises; the
construction of apartments; the use of water resources of local importance, the operation,
maintenance and development of water supply and sewerage system; the fuel supply and
its sale; the construction and maintenance of local roads; the organization of funeral
services and maintenance of cemeteries; the management of local transportation and
communication services; the setting up of conditions needed for establishing catering and
consumer services; the facilitation of the development of cultural institutions, the
maintenance of historic and cultural structures; the management of information services,
and creating the conditions for mass media activities; the provision of assistance, in
addition to the state-provided help, to orphans, sick, elderly, poor, gifted and talented
children; the support of physical education and sports; the stimulation of employment
opportunities, the provision of social and legal protection of youth; other areas of local
infrastructure.
Economic development
Issues of local importance in the areas of agriculture, industry, communications,
transportation, etc.
Environment
The preservation of the ecological balance in the community; the improvement and
renovation of municipal territories; refuse collection and disposal; the prevention of
water, soil and air pollution; joint programs with neighboring municipalities, etc.
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